Abstract. We first propose the notion of universally anonymizable publickey encryption. Suppose that we have the encrypted data made with the same security parameter, and that these data do not satisfy the anonymity property. Consider the situation that we would like to transform these encrypted data to those with the anonymity property without decrypting these encrypted data. In this paper, in order to formalize this situation, we propose a new property for public-key encryption called universal anonymizability. If we use a universally anonymizable public-key encryption scheme, not only the person who made the ciphertexts, but also anyone can anonymize the encrypted data without using the corresponding secret key. We then propose universally anonymizable public-key encryption schemes based on the ElGamal encryption scheme, the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, and RSA-OAEP, and prove their security.
Introduction
The classical security requirement of public-key encryption schemes is that it provides privacy of the encrypted data. Popular formalizations such as indistinguishability or non-malleability, under either the chosen-plaintext or the chosenciphertext attacks are directed at capturing various data-privacy requirements.
Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai, and Pointcheval [1] proposed a new security requirement of encryption schemes called "key-privacy" or "anonymity." It asks that an encryption scheme provides (in addition to privacy of the data being encrypted) privacy of the key under which the encryption was performed. That is, if an encryption scheme provides the key-privacy, then the receiver is anonymous from the point of view of the adversary.
In addition to the notion of key-privacy, they provided the RSA-based anonymous encryption scheme, RSA-RAEP, which is a variant of RSA-OAEP (Bellare and Rogaway [2] , Fujisaki, Okamoto, Pointcheval, and Stern [7] ). Recently, Hayashi, Okamoto, and Tanaka [10] proposed the RSA-based anonymous encryption scheme by using the RSACD function. Hayashi and Tanaka [11] constructed RSA-OAEP Sampling Twice [11] the RSA-based anonymous encryption scheme by using the sampling twice technique. In [11] , they also mentioned the scheme with the expanding technique for comparison, however, there is no security proof. With respect to the discrete-log based schemes, Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai, and Pointcheval [1] proved that the ElGamal and the Cramer-Shoup encryption schemes provide the anonymity property when all of the users use a common group.
In this paper, we consider the following situation. In order to send e-mails, all members of the company use the encryption scheme which does not provide the anonymity property. They consider that e-mails sent to the inside of the company do not have to be anonymized and it is sufficient to be encrypted the data. However, when e-mails are sent to the outside of the company, they want to anonymize them for preventing the eavesdropper on the public network.
A trivial answer for this problem is that all members use the encryption scheme with the anonymity property. However, generally speaking, we require some computational costs to create ciphertexts with the anonymity property. In fact, the RSA-based anonymous encryption schemes proposed in [1, 10, 11] , which are based on RSA-OAEP, are not efficient with respect to the encryption cost or the size of ciphertexts, compared with RSA-OAEP (See Figure 1 . Here, k, k 0 , k 1 are security parameters and we assume that N is uniformly distributed in (2 k−1 , 2 k ).). Since the members do not require to anonymize the e-mails, it would be better to use the standard encryption scheme within the company.
We propose another way to solve this. Consider the situation that not only the person who made the ciphertexts, but also anyone can transform the encrypted data to those with the anonymity property without decrypting these encrypted data. If we have this situation, we can make an e-mail gateway which can transform encrypted e-mails to those with the anonymity property without using the corresponding secret key when they are sent to the outside of the company.
Furthermore, we can use this e-mail gateway in order to guarantee the anonymity property for e-mails sent to the outside of the company. The president of the company may consider that all e-mails sent to the outside of the company should be anonymized. In this case, even if someone tries to send e-mails to the outside of the company without anonymization, the e-mails passing through the e-mail gateway are always anonymized.
In this paper, in order to formalize this idea, we propose a special type of public-key encryption scheme called a universally anonymizable public-key encryption scheme. A universally anonymizable public-key encryption scheme consists of a standard public-key encryption scheme PE and two additional algorithms, that is, an anonymizing algorithm UA and a decryption algorithm DA for anonymized ciphertexts. We can use PE as a standard encryption scheme which is not necessary to have the anonymity property. Furthermore, in this scheme, by using the anonymizing algorithm UA, anyone who has a standard ciphertext can anonymize it with its public key whenever she wants to do that. The receiver can decrypt the anonymized ciphertext by using the decryption algorithm DA for anonymized ciphertexts. Then, the adversary cannot know under which key the anonymized ciphertext was created.
To formalize the security properties for universally anonymizable public-key encryption, we define three requirements, the key-privacy, the data-privacy on standard ciphertexts, and that on anonymized ciphertexts.
We then propose the universally anonymizable public-key encryption schemes based on the ElGamal encryption scheme, the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, and RSA-OAEP, and prove their security.
We show the key-privacy property of our schemes by applying an argument in [1] with modification. The argument in [1] for the discrete-log based scheme depends heavily on the situation where all of the users employ a common group. However, in our discrete-log based schemes, we do not use the common group for obtaining the key-privacy property. Therefore, we cannot straightforwardly apply their argument to our schemes. To prove the key-privacy property of our schemes, we employ the idea described in [5] by Cramer and Shoup, where we encode the elements of QR p (a group of quadratic residues modulo p) where p = 2q+1 and p, q are prime to those of Z q . This encoding plays an important role in our schemes. We also employ the expanding technique. With this technique, if we get the ciphertext, we expand it to the common domain. This technique was proposed by Desmedt [6] . In [8] , Galbraith and Mao used this technique for the undeniable signature scheme. In [13] , Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman also used this technique for the ring signature scheme.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the definitions of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem, the families of hash functions, and the RSA family of trap-door permutations. In Section 3, we formulate the notion of universally anonymizable public-key encryption and its security properties. We propose the universally anonymizable public-key encryption scheme based on the ElGamal encryption scheme in Section 4, that based on the CramerShoup encryption scheme in Section 5, and that based on RSA-OAEP in Section 6.
Preliminaries

The Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem
In this section, we review the decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem. 
Definition 1 (DDH
The advantage of D in solving the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem for G is defined by
We say that the DDH problem for G is hard if the function Adv ddh
G,D (k) is negligible for any algorithm D whose time-complexity is polynomial in k.
The "time-complexity" is the worst case execution time of the experiment plus the size of the code of the adversary, in some fixed RAM model of computation.
Families of Hash Functions
In this section, we describe the definitions of families of hash functions and universal one-wayness. 
Definition 2 (Families of Hash Functions
Definition 3 (Universal One-Wayness). Let H = (GH, EH) be a family of hash functions and let C = (C 1 , C 2 ) be an adversary. We consider the following experiment:
Note that si is the state information. We define the advantage of C via
We say that the family of hash functions H is universal one-way if Adv uow H,C (k) is negligible for any algorithm C whose time-complexity is polynomial in k.
The RSA Family of Trap-Door Permutations
In this section, we describe the definitions of the RSA family of trap-door permutations denoted by RSA and θ-partial one-wayness of RSA. 
e mod N = y for some x 2 return 1 else return 0
Here, " ||" denotes concatenation. We define the advantage of the adversary via
where the probability is taken over Note that when θ = 1 the notion of θ-partial one-wayness coincides with the standard notion of one-wayness. Fujisaki, Okamoto, Pointcheval, and Stern [7] showed that the θ-partial one-wayness of RSA is equivalent to the (1-partial) one-wayness of RSA for θ > 0.5.
Universally Anonymizable Public-Key Encryption
In this section, we propose the definition of universally anonymizable public-key encryption schemes and its security properties.
The Definition of Universally Anonymizable Public-Key Encryption Schemes
We formalize the notion of universally anonymizable public-key encryption schemes as follows. 
In the universally anonymizable public-key encryption scheme, we can use PE = (K, E, D) as a standard encryption scheme. Furthermore, in this scheme, by using the anonymizing algorithm UA, anyone who has a standard ciphertext can anonymize it whenever she wants to do that. The receiver can decrypt the anonymized ciphertext by using the decryption algorithm DA for anonymized ciphertexts.
Security Properties of Universally Anonymizable Public-Key Encryption Schemes
We now define security properties with respect to universally anonymizable public-key encryption schemes.
Data-Privacy
We define the security property called data-privacy of universally anonymizable public-key encryption schemes. The definition is based on the indistinguishability for standard public-key encryption schemes. We can consider two types of data-privacy, that is, the data-privacy on standard ciphertexts and that on anonymized ciphertexts. We first describe the definition of the data-privacy on standard ciphertexts. 
Definition 7 (Data-Privacy on Standard Ciphertexts
). Let b ∈ {0, 1} and k ∈ N. Let A cpa = (A 1 cpa , A 2 cpa ), A cca = (A 1 cca ,Experiment Exp dataS-atk-b U APE,A atk (k) (pk, sk) ← K(k); (m 0 , m 1 , si) ← A 1 atk (pk); c ← E pk (m b ); d ← A 2 atk (c, si) return d Note that m 0 , m 1 ∈ M(pk). Above it is mandated that A 2 cca never queries the challenge c to either D sk0 (·) or D sk1 (·). It is also mandated that A 2 cca never queries either the anonymized ciphertextc ∈ {UA pk 0 (c)} to DA sk 0 (·) orc ∈ {UA pk 1 (c)} to DA sk 1 (·). For atk ∈ {cpa, cca}, we define the advantage via Adv dataS-atk U APE,A atk (k) = Pr[Exp dataS-atk-1 UAPE,A atk (k) = 1] − Pr[Exp dataS-atk-0 UAPE,A atk (k) = 1] .
We say that the universally anonymizable public-key encryption scheme UAPE provides the data-privacy on standard ciphertexts against the chosen plaintext attack (respectively the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) if Adv
dataS-cpa U APE,Acpa (k) (resp. Adv dataS-cca U APE,A cca (k)) is
negligible for any adversary A whose time complexity is polynomial in k.
In the above experiment, if the challenge is c, then anyone can compute UA pk 0 (c). Therefore, in the CCA setting, we restrict the oracle access to DA as described above.
We next describe the definition of the data-privacy on anonymized ciphertexts. 
Above it is mandated that A Remark 1. In the CPA setting, if there exists an algorithm which breaks the data-privacy on anonymized ciphertexts, then we can break that on standard ciphertexts by applying the anonymizing algorithm to the standard ciphertexts and passing the resulting anonymized ciphertexts to the adversary which breaks the data-privacy on anonymized ciphertexts. Therefore, in the CPA setting, it is sufficient that the universally anonymizable public-key encryption scheme provides the data-privacy of standard ciphertexts.
On the other hand, in the CCA setting, the data privacy on standard ciphertexts does not always imply that on anonymized ciphertexts, since the oracle access of the adversary attacking the data privacy on standard ciphertexts is restricted more strictly than that on anonymized ciphertexts.
Key-Privacy
We define the security property called key-privacy of universally anonymizable public-key encryption schemes. If the scheme provides the keyprivacy, the adversary cannot know under which key the anonymized ciphertext was created. 
Note that m 0 ∈ M(pk 0 ) and m 1 ∈ M(pk 1 ). Above it is mandated that A 2 cca never queries the challenge c to either DA sk 0 (·) or DA sk 1 (·). For atk ∈ {cpa, cca}, we define the advantage via
We say that the universally anonymizable public-key encryption scheme UAPE provides the key-privacy against the chosen plaintext attack (resp. the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) if Adv
negligible for any adversary A whose time complexity is polynomial in k.
Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai, and Pointcheval [1] proposed a security requirement of encryption schemes called "key-privacy." Similar to the above definition, it asks that the encryption provides privacy of the key under which the encryption was performed. In addition to the property of the universal anonymizability, there are two differences between their definition and ours.
In [1] , they defined the encryption scheme with some common-key which contains the common parameter for all users to obtain the key-privacy property. For example, in the discrete-log based schemes such that the ElGamal and the Cramer-Shoup encryption schemes, the common key contains a common group G, and the encryption is performed over the common group for all uses.
On the other hand, in our definition, we do not prepare any common key for obtaining the key-privacy property. In the universally anonymizable publickey encryption scheme, we can use the standard encryption scheme which is not necessary to have the key-privacy property. In addition to it, anyone can anonymize the ciphertext by using its public key whenever she want to do that, and the adversary cannot know under which key the anonymized ciphertext was created.
The definition in [1] , they considered the situation that the message space was common to each user. Therefore, in the experiment of their definition, the adversary chooses only one message m from the common message space and receives a ciphertext of m encrypted with one of two keys pk 0 and pk 1 .
In our definition, we do not use common parameter and the message spaces for users may be different even if the security parameter is fixed. In fact, in Sections 4 and 5, we propose the encryption schemes whose message spaces for users are different. Therefore, in the experiment of our definition, the adversary chooses two messages m 0 and m 1 where m 0 and m 1 are in the message spaces for pk 0 and pk 1 , respectively, and receives either a ciphertext of m 0 encrypted with pk 0 or a ciphertext of m 1 encrypted with pk 1 . The ability of the adversary with two messages m 0 and m 1 might be stronger than that with one message m.
We say that a universally anonymizable public-key encryption scheme UAPE is CPA-secure (resp. CCA-secure) if the scheme UAPE provides the data-privacy on standard ciphertexts, that on anonymized ciphertexts, and the key-privacy against the chosen plaintext attack (resp. the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack).
ElGamal and its Universal Anonymizability
In this section, we propose a universally anonymizable ElGamal encryption scheme.
The ElGamal Encryption Scheme Definition 10 (ElGamal). The ElGamal encryption scheme PE
is as follows. Note that Q is a QR-group generator with a safe prime which takes as input a security parameter k and returns (q, g) where q is k-bit prime, p = 2q + 1 is prime, and g is a generator of a cyclic group QR p (a group of quadratic residues modulo p) of order q.
The ElGamal encryption scheme is secure in the sense of IND-CPA if the DDH problem for Q is hard.
Universal Anonymizability of the ElGamal Encryption Scheme
We
Expandc to the common domain (the expanding technique).
We describe the encoding function and the expanding technique.
The Encoding Function Generally speaking, it is not easy to encode the elements of a prime-order group of order q to those of Z q . We employ the idea described in [5] 
It is easy to see thatF q,t is bijective and we can defineF
The Expanding Technique This technique was proposed by Desmedt [6] . In [8] , Galbraith and Mao used this technique for the undeniable signature scheme. In [13] , Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman also used this technique for the ring signature scheme.
In the expanding technique, we expandc ∈ Z q to the common domain
{0, 1}
k+k b . In particular, we choose t
Then, for any q where |q| = k, ifc is uniformly chosen from Z q , then the statistical distance between the distribution of the output c by the expanding technique and the uniform distribution over {0, 1} k+k b is less than 1/2 k b −1 . In the following, we set k b = 160.
Our Scheme We now propose our universally anonymizable ElGamal encryption scheme. Our scheme provides the key-privacy against the chosen plaintext attack even if each user chooses an arbitrary prime q where |q| = k and p = 2q+1 is also prime, and uses a group of quadratic residues modulo p.
Definition 11. Our universally anonymizable ElGamal encryption scheme UAPE
and two algorithms described as follows.
Security
In this section, we prove that our universally anonymizable ElGamal encryption scheme UAPE EG is CPA-secure assuming that the DDH problem for Q is hard. We can easily see that our scheme provides the data-privacy on standard ciphertexts against the chosen plaintext attack if the DDH problem for Q is hard. More precisely, we can prove that if there exists a CPA-adversary attacking the data-privacy on standard ciphertexts of our scheme with advantage , then there exists a CPA-adversary attacking the indistinguishability of the ElGamal encryption scheme with the same advantage .
Note that this implies our scheme provides the data-privacy on anonymized ciphertexts against the chosen plaintext attack if the DDH problem for Q is hard.
We now prove our scheme provides the key-privacy against the chosen plaintext attack. To prove this, we use the idea of Halevi [9] .
Lemma 1 (Halevi [9] 
This lemma shows the relation between the indistinguishability and the keyprivacy for standard encryption scheme. We can apply this lemma to our universally anonymizable encryption scheme. That is, if the universally anonymizable encryption scheme UAPE = ((K, E, D) , UA, DA) provides the data-privacy on anonymized ciphertexts against CCA (resp. CPA) and the statistical distance between the two distributions
is negligible, then UAPE provides the key-privacy against CCA (resp. CPA).
By using this, in order to prove that our scheme provides the key-privacy against the chosen plaintext attack, all we have to do is to see that the two distributions D 0 and D 1 derived by our scheme satisfy the property defined above. It is easy to see that the statistical distance between D 0 and D 1 is less than 2 × (1/2 159 ) 2 . In conclusion, our universally anonymizable ElGamal encryption scheme is CPA-secure assuming that the DDH problem for Q is hard.
Cramer-Shoup and its Universal Anonymizability
In this section, we propose a universally anonymizable Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme.
The Cramer-Shoup Encryption Scheme Definition 12 (Cramer-Shoup). The Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme PE
CS = (K CS , E CS , D CS ) is defined
as follows. Let H = (GH, EH) be a family of hash functions. Note that Q is a QR-group generator with a safe prime.
Cramer and Shoup [5] proved that the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2 assuming that H is universal one-way and the DDH problem for Q is hard. Lucks [12] recently proposed a variant of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme for groups of unknown order. This scheme is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2 assuming that the family of hash functions in the scheme is universal one-way, and both the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in QR N (a set of quadratic residues modulo N ) and factoring N are hard.
Universal Anonymizability of the Cramer-Shoup Encryption Scheme
We propose our universally anonymizable Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme. Our scheme provides the key-privacy against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack even if each user chooses an arbitrary prime q where |q| = k and p = 2q + 1 is also prime, and uses a group of quadratic residues modulo p.
Note that in our scheme we employ the encoding function and the expanding technique appeared in Section 4.
Definition 13. Our universally anonymizable Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme
Security
In this section, we prove that our universally anonymizable Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme UAPE EG is CCA-secure assuming that the DDH problem for Q is hard and H is universal one-way.
We can prove that our scheme provides the data-privacy on standard ciphertexts against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack if the DDH problem for Q is hard and H is universal one-way. More precisely, we can prove that if there exists a CCA-adversary A attacking the data-privacy on standard ciphertexts of our scheme with advantage , then there exists a CCA2-adversary B attacking the indistinguishability of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme with the same advantage . In the reduction of the proof, we have to simulate the decryption oracles for anonymized ciphertexts for A. If A makes a query c = (u 1 , u 2 , e , v ) to DA sk0 (·), we simply compute c = (u 1 mod q 0 , u 2 mod q 0 , e mod q 0 , v mod q 0 ) and decrypt c by using the decryption algorithm D sk 0 (·) for standard ciphertexts for B. We can simulate DA sk 1 (·) in a similar way.
In order to prove that our scheme provides the key-privacy and the dataprivacy on anonymized ciphertexts against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, we need restriction as follows.
We define the set of ciphertexts EC CS ((u 1 , u 2 , e , v ) , pk) called "equivalence class" as EC CS ((u 1 , u 2 , e , v ) , pk) is also an anonymized ciphertext of m under pk. Therefore, when c is a challenge anonymized ciphertext, the adversary can ask an anonymized ciphertextč ∈ EC CS (c , pk 0 ) to the decryption oracle DA To prevent these attacks, we add some natural restriction to the adversaries in the definitions of the key-privacy and the data-privacy on anonymized ciphertexts. That is, it is mandated that the adversary never queries eitherč ∈ EC CS (c , pk 0 ) to DA CS sk 0 orč ∈ EC CS (c , pk 1 ) to DA CS sk 1 . It is also mandated that the adversary never queries either (u 1 mod q 0 , u 2 
We think these restrictions are natural and reasonable. Actually, in the case of undeniable and confirmer signature schemes, Galbraith and Mao [8] defined the anonymity on undeniable signature schemes with the above restriction. In [11] , Hayashi and Tanaka also employed the same restriction in order to prove the anonymity of their encryption scheme. Incidentally, Canetti, Krawczyk, and Nielsen [4] proposed a relaxed notion of CCA security, called Replayable CCA (RCCA). In their security model, the schemes which require restriction such as equivalence class for proving their CCA security satisfy a variant of RCCA, pd-RCCA (publicly-detectable replayable-CCA) secure. If we add these restrictions then we can prove that our scheme provides the data-privacy on anonymized ciphertexts against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack if the DDH problem for Q is hard and H is universal one-way. More precisely, we can prove that if there exists a CCA-adversary attacking the dataprivacy on anonymized ciphertexts of our scheme with advantage , then there exists a CCA-adversary attacking the data-privacy on standard ciphertexts of our scheme with the same advantage .
We now prove our scheme provides the key-privacy against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. If we add the restrictions described above, we can prove this in a similar way as that for our universally anonymizable ElGamal encryption scheme. Note that the statistical distance between D 0 and D 1 (See Section 4.3.) is less than 2 × (1/2 159 ) 4 . In conclusion, our universally anonymizable Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme is CCA-secure assuming that the DDH problem for Q is hard and H is universal one-way.
RSA-OAEP and its Universal Anonymizability
In this section, we propose a universally anonymizable RSA-OAEP scheme. 
Fujisaki, Okamoto, Pointcheval, and Stern [7] proved that OAEP with partial one-way permutations is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2 in the random oracle model. They also showed that RSA is one-way if and only if RSA is θ-partial one-way for θ > 0.5. Thus, RSA-OAEP is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2 in the random oracle model assuming RSA is one-way.
Universal Anonymizability of RSA-OAEP
A simple observation that seems to be folklore is that if one publishes the ciphertext of the RSA-OAEP scheme directly (without anonymization) then the scheme does not provide the key-privacy. Suppose an adversary knows that the ciphertext c is created under one of two keys (N 0 , e 0 ) or (N 1 , e 1 ), and suppose N 0 ≤ N 1 . If c ≥ N 0 then the adversary bets it was created under (N 1 , e 1 ), else the adversary bets it was created under (N 0 , e 0 ). It is not hard to see that this attack has non-negligible advantage.
To anonymize ciphertexts of RSA-OAEP, we do not have to employ the encoding function and we only use the expanding technique. 
Security
In this section, we prove that our universally anonymizable RSA-OAEP scheme UAPE RO is CCA-secure in the random oracle model assuming RSA is one-way. We can prove that our scheme provides the data-privacy on standard ciphertexts against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model assuming RSA is θ-partial one-way for θ > 0.5. More precisely, if RSA-OAEP is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2 then our scheme provides the data-privacy on standard ciphertexts against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. The proof is similar to that for our universally anonymizable Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme.
In order to prove that our scheme provides the key-privacy and the dataprivacy on anonymized ciphertexts against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, we need the restrictions similar to those for our universally anonymizable Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme. We define the equivalence class for our universally anonymizable RSA-OAEP scheme as
where pk = (N, e) and it is mandated that the adversary never queries eitheř c ∈ EC RO (c , pk 0 ) to DA . If we add these restrictions then we can prove that our scheme provides the data-privacy on anonymized ciphertexts against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model assuming RSA is θ-partial one-way for θ > 0.5 in a similar way as that for our universally anonymizable Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme.
Furthermore, if we add the restrictions described above, then we can prove that our scheme provides the key-privacy against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model assuming RSA is θ-partial one-way for θ > 0.5. More precisely, we show the following theorem 1 . 
and the running time of B is that of
In conclusion, since RSA is θ-partial one-way if and only if RSA is one-way for θ > 0.5, our universally anonymizable RSA-OAEP scheme is CCA-secure in the random oracle model assuming RSA is one-way.
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is similar to that for RSA-RAEP. We construct the partial inverting algorithm M for the RSA function using a CCA-adversary A attacking the keyprivacy of our encryption scheme. We describe the partial inverting algorithm M for RSA using a CCA-adversary A attacking the anonymity of our encryption scheme. M is given pk = (N, e, k) and a point y ∈ Z * N where |y| = k = n+k 0 +k 1 . Let sk = (N, d, k) be the corresponding secret key. The algorithm is trying to find the n + k 1 most significant bits of the e-th root of y modulo N . We next bound the probability that ¬YBad occurs. 
Assuming ¬YBad occurs, we have by the random choice of b and symmetry, that the probability of M outputting s is at least Substituting the bounds for the above probabilities and re-arranging the terms, we get the claimed result. Finally, we estimate the time complexity of M . It is the time complexity of A plus the time for simulating the random oracles. In the random oracle simulation, for each pair ((g, G g ), (h, H h ) ), it is sufficient to compute y h,g,0 = z e0 mod N 0 and y h,g,1 = z e1 mod N 1 . Therefore, the time complexity of M is that of A plus q gen · q hash · O(k 3 ).
